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ABSTRACT 
 
Fair value accounting refers to the accounting method which an asset or liability is estimated based on the current 
market price, so called fair value. Under the fair value accounting, it is more difficult for managers to hide bad 
information, because the value of an asset or liabilities is re-estimated periodically to reflect the changes in fair value 
in the market. In this case, firms’ financial stability will be increased. On the other hand, fair value accounting can 
intensity the volatility of the numbers in the financial statement, which leads to decreases the financial stability. This 
papers empirically examines the effect of the fair value accounting on the financial stability based on the IFRS 
adoption in Korea. Using the non-financial firms listed in KOSPI and KOSDAQ from 2000 to 2013, we find that the 
expansion of fair value accounting increases financial stability. The results support the argument that fair value 
accounting prohibits managers from hiding bad information, rather it enforces the disclosure of value-relevant 
information to the investors. The results are consistent with a battery of robustness checks. Thus, the overall results 
show that the expansion of fair value accounting increase financial stability.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he role of fair value accounting is in big controversy, especially after financial crisis. Fair value 
accounting highlights the value-relevant information through mark-to-market accounting. Under the 
mark-to-market accounting, assets and liabilities are re-estimated periodically to reflect changes in their 
value and thus accounting information better reflects true underlying performance and financial statements. And due 
to the mechanism that periodically changes the reported value, it is more difficult for managers to hid bad information 
to investors under this system. As a results, the information are disclosed to public in a timely manner, works as an 
early warning mechanisms, which leads to the improvement in firm’s financial stability.  
 
However, there is also a cost in applying fair value accounting. First, the reliability of the accounting number is likely 
to be distorted since the fair value is estimated by the managers who tend to pursue the strong self-interests. Second, 
under the fair value accounting, changes in market value can impact on either net income or other comprehensive 
income. Managers have an opportunistic incentive to transfer the unrealized gains and losses to other comprehensive 
income, which causes the selective gains trading. Third, the fair value measures sometimes provides less relevant 
information than amortized (Song and No, 2011). In this respect, fair value accounting is likely to be related to the 
economic or accounting events that are not directly linked to the firm’s operation activities. According to this view, 
fair value accounting can impose risks and harm the financial stability.  
 
Despite the competing argument in the relations between fair value accounting and financial stability, there is no direct 
empirical analysis that examine the effect of fair value accounting and financial stability. Even if there are some 
empirical studies, they only focused on financial industries (Barth et al., 1995; Veron. 2008) and does not provide 
implication for non-financial industries.  
 
T 
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However, Korea provides a good research setting to test the effect of fair value accounting on crash risk for 
nonfinancial firms. Since 2011, all listed companies in Korea have to adopt IFRS, which requires all firms to apply 
extensive fair value accounting in estimating the value of the assets and liabilities. Since previous Korean accounting 
standard used historical cost accounting system, IFRS adoption could be a good research setting to test the effect of 
fair value accounting on financial stability, especially for nonfinancial firms. So, the purpose of this paper is to get a 
comprehensive implication with regard to the effect of fair value accounting on the financial stability. Following prior 
studies, we measure financial stability using the first, second, and third moment of stock returns: the frequency of 
crash risk, volatility, and negative skewness respectively. (Chen et al. 2001; DeFond et al. 2015; Hutton et al. 2009; 
Kim et al. 2010, 2011).  
 
Using the listed firms in KOSPI and KOSDAQ from 2000 to 2013, we find that the expansion of fair value accounting 
increases financial stability. It supports the argument that fair value accounting prohibits managers from hiding 
information, rather it enforces the disclosure of value-relevant information to the investors. The results are consistent 
with a battery of robustness checks. To remove the effect of financial crisis on the financial stability, we examine the 
separate period, but the main results are not changed. And when we analyze the subsample of firms that adopted IFRS 
voluntarily, financial stability is also improved after the adoption of IFRS. Thus, the overall results show that the 
expansion of fair value accounting increase financial stability.  
 
Despite the measurement errors and correlated omitted problems, this paper contributes to the literatures as follows: 
First, it is the first paper that empirically examines the effect of fair value accounting on financial stability in 
nonfinancial firms. Second, by comparing the two different accounting system, historical cost accounting versus fair 
value accounting, it provides practical implication for regulators. Even though fair value accounting can be a double-
edged sword, it can work as an instrument for curbing managers’ opportunistic behavior.  
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional backgrounds in Korea and 
hypothesis development; Section 3 and 4 discusses the research design and data, respectively. Section 5 and 6 shows 
the main empirical results and sensitivity checks; Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
2. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1. Fair-Value Accounting in Korea  
 
Korea adopted IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) to enhance the accounting transparency in 2011. 
Adoption of IFRS has influenced various accounting practices in Korea. Korea Accounting Standard Board (KASB) 
pointed out that the extended application of fair value accounting is one of the key characteristics of IFRS compared 
to previous accounting standard.1 
 
Before the adoption of IFRS, Korean accounting standard (K-GAAP) is largely based on the cost model in evaluating 
assets and liabilities. Under the cost model, which emphasize the reliability in accounting information, assets and 
liabilities are recorded at the initial cost when they are acquired and the value of the assets and liabilities are not 
changed. Since there is less uncertainty in estimating the value of the assets and liabilities, cost model is better in 
terms of the reliability.  
 
However, cost-based model does not provide useful information because the recorded value can be far from the market 
value. Thus, IFRS requires fair value measurement and disclosures to provide more value relevant information. 
Specifically, all financial assets and liabilities that satisfy certain criteria are estimated based on market value and 
gain/loss from the financial instruments can be included in net income. IFRS also permits fair-value accounting to 
nonfinancial assets and liabilities. For example, fair-value accounting can be applied to tangible assets such as land or 
buildings as well as liabilities including post-employment benefit obligations.  
 
  
                                                
1 As a key difference between IFRS and K-GAAP, KASB mentioned principle-based accounting, fair-value accounting and consolidated financial 
statement.  (http://www.kasb.or.kr/web/services/page/viewPage.action?page=standards/kifrs_diff.html) 
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2.2. Hypothesis Development  
 
Fair value accounting highlights the value-relevant information through mark-to-market accounting. Under the mark-
to-market accounting, assets and liabilities are re-estimated periodically to reflect changes in their value and thus 
accounting information better reflects true underlying performance and financial statements  
 
However, there is a cost in applying fair value accounting. First, the reliability of the accounting number is likely to 
be distorted since the fair value is estimated by the managers who tend to pursue the strong self-interests. Second, 
under the fair value accounting, changes in market value can impact on either net income or other comprehensive 
income. Managers have an opportunistic incentives to transfer the unrealized gains and losses to other comprehensive 
income, which causes the selective gains trading2. Third, the amortized cost can be more relevant than the fair value 
measures since amortized cost is likely to focus on the decision of purchasing, realized income effect and the recovery 
value (Song and No, 2011). In this respect, fair value accounting is likely to be related to the economic or accounting 
events that are not directly linked to the firm’s operation activities.  
 
This controversy in fair value accounting is also related to the financial stability. Due to the double sides of fair value 
accounting, the effect of fair value accounting on the financial stability is also inconclusive. Financial stability means 
that the stock does not move sharply in the capital market. It sometimes has the opposite concept of crash risk. 
Financial stability can be considered in three different aspects. First, if the frequency of extreme negative stock returns 
are too high, the stock is regarded as financially unstable. This is related to the first moment of stock returns. Second 
aspect is volatility, the second moment of stock returns. If the volatility of the stock is too high, the stock is regarded 
as financially unstable. Third one is negative return skewness of the firms, which is a third moment of stock returns. 
If the firm has a disproportionate likelihood of experiencing extreme negative stock returns, financial stability of the 
firms is considered low.  
 
Some studies provide a hint that fair value accounting has a positive effect on financial stability. Bleck and Liu (2007) 
show a theoretical rationale for a shift in accounting standards from historic cost accounting to marking to market 
accounting. According to the paper, marking to market accounting system can better reflect true performance because 
it provides investors with an early warning mechanisms. Thus, under the fair value accounting, it becomes more 
difficult for manages to hide bad news. On the other hand, managers have greater opportunities to mask a firm’s true 
economic performance under historical cost accounting.  
 
Some empirical studies also support the positive role of fair value accounting on the financial stability during the crisis 
period. During the crisis period, stock returns fluctuate severely. However, Barth et al. (2010) show that fair value 
accounting is likely to relate little or no role to the financial crisis. Laux et al. (2010) also contradict the contention 
that fair value accounting has contributed to the year 2008 financial crisis, proposed by the European Commission and 
U.S. Congress. Instead, they find that there is little evidence as to whether fair value accounting played a role in the 
U.S banks' problems during the financial crisis. 
 
A recent study by the IMF (2008) delineates pro-cyclical impact of fair value accounting on the capital ratios of banks 
and seeks potential measures that could mitigate it, which includes expanding the set of liabilities that are mark-to-
market and limiting the impact of changes in fair value on the balance sheet via a smoothing mechanism or a circuit 
breaker. This suggests fair value accounting system mitigate the impact of macroeconomic factors on the financial 
statement from pro-cyclical market movement. Practically, IMF exhorts the adoption of fair value estimation for the 
reasons above. 
 
On the other hand, some prior literatures provide evidence that support the negative effect of fair value accounting on 
the financial stability. For example, banks that have experienced losses from the deficiency of liquidity in crisis period 
transferred their accounting system from fair value accounting to historical cost accounting (Basel Committee, 2008). 
                                                
2 Song and Ji (2009) and Song and No (2011) assert that since the gains and losses of valuation from available sales are recognized as capital stocks, 
among these accrued gains and losses of valuation, certain parts of gains and losses are likely to be used as a tool for the firm's earnings management 
by cherry-picking. To diminish the possibility of inappropriate uses of gains and losses of valuation, K-IFRS restraints the recognition of unrealized 
gains and losses as another comprehensive income. Even if the gains and losses were recognized as another comprehensive income and subsequently 
realized, the unrealized gains and losses should be reclassified as current net income. 
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This indicates that the application of the fair value accounting system at financial institutions appears to have weakness 
and inconsistency in regards to the recent financial crisis in 2008. Under the financial crisis, serious write-offs are 
required in terms of financial assets at fair value, deteriorating their financial liquidation and credit evaluation. 
Ultimately, the financial stability is ruined (IIF, 2008)3. In addition, banks recognize the losses at fair value under the 
economic recession and thus attempt to raise extra capital to maintain their solvency ratio (Veron, 2008) 4. Also, 
Youngman (2008) asserts that since the financial market is frequently occupied by the market participants’ optimism 
or pessimism, fair value accounting unintentionally affects the economy and its financial system. Furthermore, fair 
value accounting intensifies the volatility of the earnings in bank industries (Barth et al., 1995).  
 
Despite the controversy in the relations between fair value accounting and financial stability, there is no direct 
empirical analysis that examine the effect of fair value accounting and financial stability. Bleck and Liu (2007) show 
a theoretical comparison between historic cost accounting versus fair value accounting, they did not show any 
empirical analyses. Even if there are some empirical studies, they only focused on financial industries (Barth et al., 
1995; Veron. 2008). The empirical analyses in these studies are largely based on the financial institutions, especially 
around crisis period, and there is lack of literatures that examines the effect of fair value accounting in nonfinancial 
companies. International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39, which is directly related to the fair value accounting, contains 
the standards about the recognition and measurement of financial instruments. That is why many prior literatures deal 
with financial industries.  
 
However, Korea provides a good research setting to test the effect of fair value accounting on crash risk for 
nonfinancial firms. Since 2011, all listed companies in Korea have to adopt IFRS, which requires all firms to apply 
extensive fair value accounting in estimating the value of the assets and liabilities. Since previous Korean accounting 
standard used historical cost accounting system, IFRS adoption could be a good research setting to test the effect of 
fair value accounting on the crash risk, especially for nonfinancial firms. Thus, using the Korean data, we test the 
following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis: Ceteris paribus, fair value accounting has no effect on financial stability  
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1. Measuring Financial Stability  
 
Financial stability is measured using three variables: crash risk(CRASH), negative skewness(NCSKEW), and stock 
return volatility(VOL). These three measures are related to the first, second, and third moment of stock return 
respectively and are inverse measures of financial stability.  
 
3.1.1 Crash Risk (CRASH) 
 
Our first financial stability measure is crash risk, which is widely used in prior studies (Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 
2010). To measure crash risk, we first estimate firm-specific weekly returns for each firm and year from the following 
expanded market model:  
 𝑟"#=𝛼%+𝛽'"𝑟(,#*'+𝛽+"𝑟",#*'+𝛽,"𝑟(,#+𝛽-"𝑟",#+𝛽."𝑟(,#/'+𝛽0"𝑟",#/'+𝜀",#     (1) 
 
                                                
3 IIF (2008) reports that the write-off is likely to increase financial risk or liquidity premia under the current fair value accounting system, since the 
fair value accounting accelerates further write-downs, margin calls, and the financial volatility. Thus, it is the main cause of the exceeding actual 
economic losses of many financial instruments.   
4 Both IFRS and US GAAP require the disclosure that fair value hierarchy must be attached to the financial statement for financial instruments. 
This hierarchy arrays level 1, 2 and 3 depending on the market activation. If assets are traded in active market, it should be included in level 1. If 
an asset is not traded in active market but it has a benchmark price from similar instruments, it should be in level 2. Level 3 includes assets that are 
not traded in active market or have benchmark price in the market; they can only be relied upon the particular individual valuation model to have 
their value estimated. Under this disclosure system, the condition of complex financial instruments in the market breaks out the imbalance between 
supply and demand of the financial instruments. This leads to the liquidation since the asset's value loses relevance with its future cash flow capacity. 
Thus, the banks are required to report without the asset's real value in this situation. Ultimately, the firm's solvency ratio deteriorates because of the 
shrinking of the firm's equity value. To protect their solvency ratio, they raise a capital from new financing activities (Veron, 2008).   
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where 
 𝑟%,#		: the return on stock i in week t 𝑟(,#	: the return on market index (KOSPI index, KOSDAQ index) in week t 𝜀"#			: residual in Equation (1) 
 
We also include the lead and lag terms to allow the non-simultaneous transaction effects (Dimson, 1979). The firm 
specific weekly return for firm i in week t (𝑊"#) is measured by the natural log of one plus the residual (𝜀"#) in Eq. (1).  
 
We define crash weeks as those weeks during which the stock return experiences weekly returns 3.2 standard 
deviations below the mean weekly returns over the entire fiscal year. 3.2 standard deviation is equivalent to the 0.1% 
in the normal distribution. CRASH, which is the first financial stability measure, is defined as an indicator variable 
that equals to one for a firm-year that experiences one or more firm-specific weekly returns falling 3.2 standard 
deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. The mean value of 
CRASH is 0.129, indicating that 12.9% of Korean listed firms, on average, experienced at least one crash event during 
a given year.  
 
3.1.2 Negative Skewness (NCSKEW)  
 
We measure our second financial stability proxy, NCSKEW, using the negative conditional return skewness (Chen et 
al. 2001; DeFond et al. 2015; Kim et al. 2011). Main cause of the NCSKEW is the volatility feedback effects (French 
et al., 1987; Campbell and Hentschel 1992). For example, the large variance of price may cause investors to be more 
hesitant and cautious, driving the risk premium from the financial market. Furthermore, the increased risk premium is 
likely to drop the equilibrium price. It will reinforce the impact of the bad news or weaken the impact of the good 
news. This procedure creates negative skewness (NCSKEW). Thus, stock return with higher negative skewness 
indicates that the firm’s financial stability is low.  
 
We measure NCSKEW by taking the negative value of the third moment of the firm-specific weekly returns for each 
sample period and then we divide it by the standard deviation of the firm–specific weekly returns raised to the third 
power, as shown in the Equation (2) below: 
 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊"# = -[𝑛(𝑛 − 1),/+∑𝑊"#,]/ [(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2)( 𝑊"#+ ),/+]          (2) 
 
3.1.3 Stock return Volatility (VOL)  
 
Our last measure for financial stability is stock return volatility, VOL. Compare to the previous two measures, VOL 
does not premise the direction of the stock return. Volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of the firm i’s 
weekly returns at a given year. Higher volatility indicates that the firm’s stock price changes suddenly and 
unexpectedly. In other words, volatile stock return means lower financial stability.  
 
3.2 Research Models 
 
We set the model (3) and (4) to show the relation between fair value disclosure and firm’s financial stability as follows: 
 𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻",#	 𝑜𝑟	𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊",#	𝑜𝑟	𝑉𝑂𝐿",#	= 	 𝛼H + 	𝛼'𝐹𝐴𝐼𝑅",# + 	𝛼+𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁",#*' + 	𝛼,𝑅𝐸𝑇",#*' + 	𝛼-𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸",#*'+ 	𝛼.𝑀𝐵",#*' + 	𝛼0𝐿𝐸𝑉",#*' + 𝛼R𝑅𝑂𝐴",#*' 	+ 𝛼S𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊"#*'+ 𝛼T𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸",#*' 	+ 𝛴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆 +	𝜖"# (3) 
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Where  
 𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻",# : an indicator variable that takes the value of one for a firm-year that experiences one or more 
firm-specific weekly returns of firm j at year t 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊",# : the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year period of firm i at 
year t 𝑉𝑂𝐿",# : the standard deviation of the firm i’s weekly returns at year t 𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁",#*' : the average of firm-specific weekly trading turnover over the fiscal year period of firm i at 
year t-1 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴",#*' : the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year period of firm i at 
year t-1 𝑅𝐸𝑇",#*' : the mean of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year t-1  𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸",#*' : the log of market value of equity of firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year  𝑀𝐵",#*' : the market value of the equity divided by the book value of equity of firm i at the beginning 
of the fiscal year  𝐿𝐸𝑉",#*' : the total debts divided by total assets of firm i at the beginning of the fiscal year  𝑅𝑂𝐴",#*' : the income before extraordinary items for fiscal year 5-1 divided by average total assets of 
firm i  𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸",#*' : the moving sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals over the last three years (years 
t-1, t-2, and t-3) of firm i  
 
We use 𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻",#	(𝑜𝑟	𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊",#	𝑜𝑟	𝑉𝑂𝐿",#	) as dependent variables to show their relations to the fair value 
accounting. 𝐹𝐴𝐼𝑅",# represents our main interest variable which equals to one in the year after the K-IFRS adoption 
and 0 otherwise. Based on the prior studies (Chen et al. 2001; Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011a, 2011b) we control 
the following variables that are regarded as the determinants of crash risk:𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁#*', 𝑅𝐸𝑇#*', 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸#*', 𝑀𝐵#*',	𝐿𝐸𝑉#*', 𝑅𝑂𝐴#*', 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊#*', 𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸#.  
 
DTURN is the detrended average monthly stock turnover, where turnover is calculated as the monthly trading volume 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding during the previous fiscal year. DTURN indicates differences in the 
opinion among the investors, leading to positive (+) coefficient. RET is the average of weekly stock returns for the 
fiscal-year period. SIZE represents the firm size and expected coefficient is positive, because prior studies show a 
positive association between firm size and crash risk. MB is the market to book the ratio. Since growth firms are more 
likely to face negative stock shocks and higher return volatility, we expect MB to be positively related to crash risk. 
LEV represents the long-term financial stability at time t. Since higher leverage is likely to go through higher financial 
risk, we expect that LEV to be positively associated to the firm’s crash risk. ROA, which represents the profitability, 
are expected to have a negative sign because firms with higher profitability have a stable financial condition. 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊#*' represents the prior period NCSKEW, regarded as one of the determinant of the current financial stability 
(Chen et al., 2001). We also suggest OPAQUE as the proxy of financial transparency. Hutton et al. (2009) found that 
the opacity of financial information is positively related to the firm’s crash risk. Finally, we add the industry dummy 
(∑INDUS) to the control industry fixed effects.  
 
4. SAMPLE AND DATA 
 
The sample includes all nonfinancial firms that are listed on Korean exchange market, KOSPI and KOSDAQ, from 
2000 to 2013. The year 1999 is included when we define the stock crash (CRASH), negative skewness (NCSKEW) 
and the stock volatility (VOL) since we use the one-year-prior stock weekly returns to estimate these dependent 
variables. All the other control variables used in the data in the sample period from the year 2000 to 2013.  
 
We excluded firms that belong to financial industry and firms whose fiscal year is not December. Financial institutions 
are excluded because their financial reporting standard differs from other industries.5 In addition, fair value accounting 
                                                
5 Before the adoption of K-IFRS in 2011, the reporting system is used to differentiate between general manufacturing firms and financial firms. 
However, after the adoption of K-IFRS the gap between general manufacturing firms and financial firms is not distinguished since K-IFRS does 
not provide special accounting rules for financial firms.    
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and crash risk in the financial industries, especially during the crisis period, are already covered in the prior studies. 
After deleting observations that have missing values in variables needed to estimate financial stability and other 
control variables, 16,521 firm-year observations are used in the main analysis. <Table 1> shows summary statistics 
that used in the main analysis.   
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
NCSKEW 12,988 -0.2571 0.9608 -6.8043 -0.2431 5.3663 
CRASH 12,988 0.1290 0.3352 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
VOL 12,988 7.9306 3.8772 0.0000 7.0921 56.7347 
DTURN 12,988 -0.0034 0.0335 -0.9937 -0.0010 0.4949 
RET 12,988 0.3386 1.7817 -40.7400 0.2252 71.4300 
SIZE 12,988 17.9724 1.5387 12.2691 17.7057 26.1358 
MB 12,988 1.3287 6.0562 -89.7471 0.8328 483.8676 
LEV 12,988 0.4653 0.3505 0.0086 0.4612 26.4768 
ROA 12,988 0.0041 0.2377 -13.0930 0.0298 9.6883 
OPAQUE 12,988 0.2792 0.3962 0.0048 0.2014 17.4771 
 
Table 2 shows the correlation among the main variables used in the empirical tests. First, 𝐹𝐴𝐼𝑅# is negatively (-) 
related with all the dependent variables (𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻#, 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊#, 𝑉𝑂𝐿#). It means that the expansion of the fair value 
accounting is likely to decrease the financial stability. For the control variables, firm size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸#*') and profitability 
(𝑅𝑂𝐴#*') are the main causes of the decreased financial stability. On the other hand, the firm’s leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉#*') and 
opacity (𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸#*') are positively (+) related to the financial stability as we expected.  
 
Before exhibiting the main empirical results, we show the trends of the main dependent variables (NCSKEW & VOL) 
during research period. Panel A of Figure 1 displays the trend of NCSKEW from the year 2000 to 2013. It indicates 
that the average of NCSKEW differs between period 1 (2000-2010) and 2 (2011-2013). We find that the average value 
is lower in period 2, compared to period 1. We also attempt to adjust the time period during the year 2006-2013 to 
show the more recent trends. Panel B of Figure 1 obviously indicates that the average value is lower during period 2, 
compared to period 1. However, in period 1 from the year 2008 to 2009, an abrupt decrease can be seen, from which 
we can infer that the effect of financial crisis in the year 2008 affected the financial stability. This is due to the attempt 
of the regulator trying to stabilize the financial market during the financial crisis and the efforts of the firms to avoid 
a liquidity risk from the financial market. Panel A and B of Figure 2 show the results of using the VOL, another proxy 
for a financial stability. These results are similar to the results presented in Figure 1. Thus, we may infer that the 
financial stability has decreased due to the expansion of the fair value accounting system from IFRS since 2011 in 
Korea. 
 
Table 2. Pearson Correlation 
Variable [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
[1] 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊# 1.000            
[2] 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊#*' -0.004 1.000           
[3] 𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻# 0.173 0.012 1.000          
[4] 𝑉𝑂𝐿#*' 0.024 -0.253 0.232 1.000         
[5] 𝐹𝐴𝐼𝑅# -0.037 -0.030 -0.131 -0.183 1.000        
[6] 𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁#*' 0.003 -0.161 0.014 0.284 0.003 1.000       
[7] 𝑅𝐸𝑇#*' 0.050 -0.389 -0.008 0.169 -0.025 0.220 1.000      
[8] 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸#*' 0.145 -0.049 -0.115 -0.216 0.172 0.062 0.132 1.000     
[9] 𝑀𝐵#*' 0.028 -0.032 0.041 0.056 0.007 -0.001 0.044 0.058 1.000    
[10] 𝐿𝐸𝑉#*' 0.001 0.001 0.104 0.120 -0.021 0.025 0.008 -0.035 0.022 1.000   
[11] 𝑅𝑂𝐴#*' -0.007 -0.067 -0.174 -0.181 0.020 -0.007 0.080 0.146 -0.064 -0.286 1.000  
[12] 𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸#*' 0.026 0.031 0.135 0.231 -0.076 -0.017 -0.029 -0.101 0.066 0.100 -0.063 1.000 
This table presents results from the Pearson Correlation analysis among the main variables used in the research models. We suggest coefficient 
estimates, among which the numbers in bold indicate at least 5% level of significance. All variables are defined in the Appendix A. 
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Figure 1. Negative Skewness Trend 
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Panel B 
  
Panel C Panel D 
 
In panel A, the dot trend represents the pattern of NCSKEW from 2000 to 2013. The broken line (AVE1) indicates the pattern of NCSKEW from 
2000-2010 before the adoption of IFRS in 2011. On the other hand, the solid line (AVE2) represents the pattern of NCSKEW from 2011 to 2013 
after the adoption of IFRS in 2011.   
 
In panel B, the dot trend represents the pattern of NCSKEW from 2006 to 2013. The broken line (AVE1) indicates the pattern of NCSKEW from 
2006-2010 before the adoption of IFRS in 2011. On the other hand, the solid line (AVE2) represents the pattern of NCSKEW from 2011 to 2013 
after the adoption of IFRS in 2011.   
 
In panel C, the solid line trend represents the pattern of NCSKEW’s mean from 2000 to 2013. The long broken line (p25) above the solid line trend 
indicates the pattern of NCSKEW from 2000 to 2013 within the first quantile (25%). On the other hand, the short broken line (p75) represents the 
pattern of NCSKEW from 2000 to 2013 within the third quantile (75%).  
 
In Panel D, the solid line trend represents the pattern of NCSKEW’s mean from 2006 to 2013. The long broken line (p25) above the solid line trend 
indicates the pattern of NCSKEW from 2006 to 2013 within the first quantile (25%). On the other hand, the short broken line (p75) represents the 
pattern of NCSKEW from 2006 to 2013 within the third quantile (75%).  
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Figure 2. Volatility Trend 
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In panel A, the dot trend represents the pattern of VOL from 2000 to 2013. The broken line (AVE1) indicates the pattern of VOL from 2000-2010 
before the adoption of IFRS in 2011. On the other hand, the solid line (AVE2) represents the pattern of VOL from 2011 to 2013 after the adoption 
of IFRS in 2011.   
 
In panel B, the dot trend represents the pattern of VOL from 2006 to 2013. The broken line (AVE1) indicates the pattern of NCSKEW from 2006-
2010 before the adoption of IFRS in 2011. On the other hand, the solid line (AVE2) represents the pattern of VOL from 2011 to 2013 after the 
adoption of IFRS in 2011.   
 
In panel C, the solid line trend represents the pattern of VOL’s mean from 2000 to 2013. The long broken line (p25) above the solid line trend 
indicates the pattern of VOL from 2000 to 2013 within the first quantile (25%). On the other hand, the short broken line (p75) represents the pattern 
of VOL from 2000 to 2013 within the third quantile (75%).  
 
In panel D, the solid line trend represents the pattern of VOL’s mean from 2006 to 2013. The long broken line (p25) above the solid line trend 
indicates the pattern of VOL from 2006 to 2013 within the first quantile (25%). On the other hand, the short broken line (p75) represents the pattern 
of VOL from 2006 to 2013 within the third quantile (75%).  
 
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Table 3 demonstrates the effect of the expansion of the fair value accounting on the financial stability due to the 
adoption of IFRS in 2011. First, Column (1) in Table 3 displays a negative coefficient on 𝐹𝐴𝐼𝑅#, indicating that the 
adoption of fair value accounting in year 2011 increases negative conditional return skewness. (Coefficient: -0.088, t-
value: -4.79). Column (2) also reports a significant negative coefficient of 𝐹𝐴𝐼𝑅# on the firm’s crash risk (Coefficient: 
-0.602, z-value: -7.93). This indicates that the expansion of fair value accounting from the year 2011 to 2013 decreases 
crash risk, representing improvement in financial stability. Column (3) reports the result of using VOL as a proxy for 
financial stability. It also shows a negative relation with FAIR (Coefficient: -0.483, t-value: -8.30).  
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All results in Table 3 generally suggest that the expansion of the fair value accounting by the adoption of IFRS 
improves the firm’s financial instability. The results are consistent with the theoretical argument advocated by Bleck 
and Liu (2007). Since the fair value accounting provides an early warning mechanisms to the investors, managers 
have less opportunity to hide bad news in the capital market. In other words, fair value accounting alleviates the firm’s 
information risk or uncertainty. As a results, the frequency of negative shocks and negative skewness in stock return 
are reduced. This results are consistent with prior literatures which argues the positive role of fair value accounting in 
the financial industries. (Barth et al. 2010; Laux et al. 2010) 
 
Table 3. Result of the Expansion of Fair Value System 𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻",#	 𝑜𝑟	𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊",#	𝑜𝑟	𝑉𝑂𝐿",#	= 	𝛼H +	𝛼'𝐹𝐴𝐼𝑅",# + 	𝛼+𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁",#*' + 	𝛼,𝑅𝐸𝑇",#*' + 	𝛼-𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸",#*' + 	𝛼.𝑀𝐵",#*' + 	𝛼0𝐿𝐸𝑉",#*'+ 𝛼R𝑅𝑂𝐴",#*' 	+ 𝛼S𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊"#*' + 𝛼T𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸",#*' 	+ 𝛴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆 +	𝜖"# (3) 
Column (1) 
Dependent = NCSKEW 
Column (2) 
Dependent = CRASH 
Column (3) 
Dependent = VOL 
 Coef. t-value  Coef. z-value  Coef. t-value 𝐹𝐴𝐼𝑅# -0.088 -4.79 𝐹𝐴𝐼𝑅# -0.602 -7.93 𝐹𝐴𝐼𝑅# -0.483 -8.30 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊#*' 0.021 2.10 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊#*'  0.122 3.55 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊#*' 0.201 6.50 𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁#*' -0.718 -2.68 𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁#*' -3.131 -4.13 𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁#*' -6.037 -7.15 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴#*' 0.010 3.53 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴#*' 0.129 14.51 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴#*' 0.349 38.82 𝑅𝐸𝑇#*' 0.016 3.22 𝑅𝐸𝑇#*' 0.008 0.48 𝑅𝐸𝑇#*' -0.027 -1.73 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸#*' 0.120 20.49 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸#*' -0.080 -3.42 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸#*' -0.397 -21.44 𝑀𝐵#*' 0.002 1.37 𝑀𝐵#*' 0.005 1.37 𝑀𝐵#*' 0.004 0.90 𝐿𝐸𝑉#*' -0.096 -2.33 𝐿𝐸𝑉#*' 0.845 5.93 𝐿𝐸𝑉#*' 1.275 9.85 𝑅𝑂𝐴#*' -0.141 -3.73 𝑅𝑂𝐴#*' -1.029 -6.83 𝑅𝑂𝐴#*' -1.396 -11.77 𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸#*' 0.077 3.57 𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸#*' 0.289 4.00 𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸#*' 0.585 8.65 
Indus Included  Indus Included  Indus Included  
Adj_R2 0.035  Pse_R2 0.104  Adj_R2 0.261  
No. obs 12,988  No. obs 12,988  No. obs 12,988  
Pro>F 0.000  Pro>chi2 0.000  Pro>F 0.000  
This table presents results from the regression analyses (H1) of the effect of fair value accounting adoption since 2011 in Korea on financial stability 
(with the value estimated in NCSKEWE, CRASH and VOL). The fair value accounting system has expanded since 2011. Thus, our main independent 
variable (FAIR) has a dummy value when the year is 2011, 2012 and 2013, the value has 0; otherwise, 1.  
 
Across all regressions, we take N=12,988 for model (3), (4) and (5) using firm-years observations from 2000 to 2013. We also suggest the results 
from the regression of CRASH and VOL with similar results with NCSKEW. We suggest coefficient estimates with t-value, only significant if t-
value (z-value) > |2|. Column 1 shows the coefficient value, wherein the dependent variable is NCSKEW as the proxy of financial stability, with 
main independent variable FAIR, representing the expansion of fair value accounting system. Column 2 and 3 present the results from similar 
regression analyses as Column 1 with financial stability estimated with CRASH and VOL. All the variables are defined in the Appendix A. 
 
6. SENSITIVITY TESTS 
 
6.1 Segment Research Periods 
 
To distinguish the effect of the financial crisis occurred in year 2008 from the adoption of K-IFRS effect, we added a 
separated time dummy variable such as Time2009, Time2010 and Time2011.  
 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊",#	(𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻",#, 𝑉𝑂𝐿",#) = 	𝛼H + 	𝛼'𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷1",# + 	𝛼+𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷2",# + 	𝛼,𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷3",# +	𝛼-𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁",#*' + 	𝛼.𝑅𝐸𝑇",#*' + 	𝛼0𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸",#*' + 	𝛼R𝑀𝐵",#*' + 	𝛼S𝐿𝐸𝑉",#*' + 𝛼T𝑅𝑂𝐴",#*' 	+𝛼'H𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊"#*' + 𝛼''𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸",#*' 	+ 𝛴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆	+	𝜖",# (4) 
 
where 
 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷1",#		: the time variable of the year 2009 of firm i 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷2",#		: the time variable of the year 2010 of firm i 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷3",#		: the time variable of the year 2011 of firm i 
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Table 4 shows the sole impact of the financial crisis in the year 2008 on the financial stability. Column (1) provides 
the result of the separated time trend variables, PERIOD1, PERIOD2 and PERIOD3, with NCSKEW. First, PERIOD1 
has a significant negative coefficient (Coefficient: -0.043, t-value: -1.39). This indicates that the financial crash risk 
is mitigated by the financial regulation, and that the efficient firm’s financial risk managements are possible during 
the financial crisis. On the other hand, PERIOD2 has a significant positive coefficient (Coefficient: 0.262, t-value: 
6.63) so when the impact of the regulation shrinks, it leads the firms to resume investment activities after the financial 
crisis. As a result, the firm’s crash risk returns to the average level. Finally, PERIOD3, represents the adopted year of 
IFRS, and reports the significant negative coefficient with NCSKEW (Coefficient: -0.377, t-value: -12.22). This 
suggests that those two events exclusively affect the financial stability. Column (2) also tests the exclusive effect of 
the financial crisis and the adoption of IFRS in terms of the financial stability by using the firm’s crash risk measure. 
PERIOD1 is not significant; however, PERIOD3, representing the expansion of fair value accounting by adoption of 
IFRS, shows a significant negative coefficient (Coefficient: -1.307, z-value: -10.06). Column (3) suggests that firm’s 
volatility (VOL) as a proxy of financial stability is related to time trend variables. First, PERIOD1 is positively related 
to firm’s volatility (Coefficient: 0.429, t-value: 4.42). But PERIOD3 shows negative relation with the firm’s volatility 
with significance (Coefficient: -0.274, t-value: -2.82). Thus, from the results of <Table 4>, we infer that the effect of 
financial crisis in the year 2008 and the effect of the adoption of IFRS in 2011 are mutually exclusive on the financial 
stability. 
 
Table 4. Empirical Result of the Segmented Research Period 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊[,\	(𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻[,\, 𝑉𝑂𝐿[,\)= 	 αH +	α'PERIOD1[,\ + 	α+PERIOD2[,\ + 	α,PERIOD3[,\ + 	α-DTURN[,\*' + 	α.RET[,\*'+ 	α0SIZE[,\*' + 	αRMB[,\*' + 	αSLEV[,\*' + αTROA[,\*' 	+ α'H𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊[\*' + α''OPAQUE[,\*' 	+ ΣINDUS	+	ϵ[,\ (4) 
Column (1) 
Dependent = NCSKEW 
Column (2) 
Dependent = CRASH 
Column (3) 
Dependent = VOL 
 Coef. t-value  Coef. z-value  Coef. t-value 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷1",# -0.043 -1.39 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷1",# -0.043 -0.32 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷1",# 0.429 4.42 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷2",# 0.262 6.63 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷2",# 0.479 2.82 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷2",# -0.852 -6.83 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷3",# -0.377 -12.22 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷3",# -1.307 -10.06 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝑂𝐷3",# -0.274 -2.82 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊#*' 0.028 2.88 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊#*' 0.127 3.65 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊#*' 0.184 5.93 𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁#*' -0.807 -3.03 𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁#*' -3.315 -4.39 𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁#*' -5.716 -6.80 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴#*' 0.016 5.68 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴#*' 0.147 15.93 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴#*' 0.352 38.69 𝑅𝐸𝑇#*' 0.005 0.96 𝑅𝐸𝑇#*' -0.033 -1.68 𝑅𝐸𝑇#*' -0.018 -1.12 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸#*' 0.124 21.11 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸#*' -0.056 -2.39 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸#*' -0.382 -20.70 𝑀𝐵#*' 0.001 1.08 𝑀𝐵#*' 0.004 1.15 𝑀𝐵#*' 0.003 0.82 𝐿𝐸𝑉#*' -0.095 -2.32 𝐿𝐸𝑉#*' 0.901 6.26 𝐿𝐸𝑉#*' 1.260 9.78 𝑅𝑂𝐴#*' -0.128 -3.43 𝑅𝑂𝐴#*' -1.021 -6.77 𝑅𝑂𝐴#*' -1.397 -11.83 𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸#*' 0.064 2.99 𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸#*' 0.253 3.46 𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸#*' 0.577 8.57 
Indus Included  Indus Included  Indus Included  
Adj_R2 0.046  Pse_R2 0.123  Adj_R2 0.270  
No. obs 12,988  No. obs 12,988  No. obs 12,988  
Pro>F 0.000  Pro>chi2 0.000  Pro>F 0.000  
This table shows the results of sensitivity test to identify the pure effect on financial stability (with the value estimated with NCSKEWE, CRASH 
and VOL) of the effect of the expansion of fair value accounting system from the effect of financial crisis in 2008 in the regression model (6), (7) 
and (8). The fair value accounting system has expanded since 2011, thus our main independent variable (FAIR) has a dummy value when the year 
is 2011, 2012 and 2013, the value has 0; otherwise, 1.  
 
Across all the regressions, we take N=12,988 for model (6), (7) and (8) using firm-years observations from 2000 to 2013. We also suggest the 
results from the regression of CRASH and VOL with similar results with CRASH. We suggest coefficient estimates with t-value, only significant if 
t-value (z-value)> |2|. Column 1 shows the coefficient value, wherein the dependent variable is NCSKEW as the proxy of financial stability, with 
main independent variable FAIR, representing the expansion of fair value accounting system. Column 2 and 3 present the results from similar 
regression analyses as Column 1 with financial stability estimated with CRASH and VOL. All the variables are defined in the Appendix A. 
 
6.2 Comparison between the Impacts on Financial Stability by Industry Types 
 
We attempt to test whether the adoption of fair value accounting affects the financial stability differently depending 
on the type of industry. Table 5 shows the industry categories.  
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Table 5. Industry Categories 
Industries N of Obs Percent Cumulative 
[1] Construction 559 3.38% 3.38% 
[4] Wholesale and Retail 1,342 8.12% 11.51% 
[5] Communication 373 2.26% 13.76% 
[6] Non-Metal Manufacturing 1,740 10.53% 24.30% 
[7] Consumer Manufacturing 1,911 11.57% 35.86% 
[9] Electronics Manufacturing 3,026 18.32% 54.18% 
[10] Expert Service 1,568 9.49% 63.67% 
[11] Detailed Manufacturing 2,741 16.59% 80.26% 
[12] Publication, Media, Broadcasting and Information Services 718 4.35% 84.61% 
[13] Chemical Manufacturing 2,543 15.39% 100% 
Total 16,521 100% 100% 
 
 
Table 6 shows the results that examine the effect of fair value accounting on financial stability of each industry. The 
results generally support that FAIR is negatively (-) related to NCSKEW (IndusN (4), (5), (7), (9), (10), and (13)). We 
can infer that the expansion of fair value accounting is likely to increase financial stability.  Thus, we conclude that 
the expansion of fair value accounting by adopting K-IFRS in 2011 affects financial stability even in the test with 
individual industries. 
 
 
Table 6. Comparison of the Impact on the Financial Stability by Individual Industry Types 
Panel A 
Variable Indus (1) Indus (4) Indus (5) Indus (6) Indus (7) 
NCSKEW Coef. t-vlaue Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 𝐹𝐴𝐼𝑅# 0.126 1.130 -0.162 -2.510 -0.249 -2.080 0.012 0.200 -0.171 -2.820 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊#*' 0.028 0.480 0.046 1.190 0.098 1.360 0.028 0.930 0.007 0.250 𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁#*' -2.626 -1.750 -1.129 -0.940 -4.186 -1.740 0.323 0.310 -1.265 -1.550 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴#*' 0.029 2.050 0.007 0.720 -0.007 -0.380 0.007 0.770 0.018 2.040 𝑅𝐸𝑇#*' -0.028 -0.590 0.051 1.510 0.092 1.340 -0.023 -1.920 0.005 0.670 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸#*' 0.145 4.480 0.107 5.730 0.013 0.410 0.092 4.710 0.174 8.570 𝑀𝐵#*' -0.070 -1.930 0.033 2.150 0.135 2.270 0.006 0.520 -0.001 -0.110 𝐿𝐸𝑉#*' -0.222 -0.800 0.114 0.850 -0.051 -0.190 -0.281 -1.810 -0.231 -1.970 𝑅𝑂𝐴#*' -0.474 -1.180 -0.088 -0.700 -0.287 -1.040 -0.271 -1.080 -0.188 -1.120 𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸#*' -0.253 -0.780 0.153 1.660 -0.236 -1.020 -0.080 -0.560 0.253 1.630 
Indus Included Included Included Included Included 
Adj_R2 0.045 0.061 0.044 0.015 0.047 
No. obs 438 1,045 301 1,357 1,495 
Prob>F 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.001 0.000 
(Table 6 continued on next page) 
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(Table 6 continued) 
Panel B 
Variable Indus (9) Indus (10) Indus (11) Indus (12) Indus (13) 
NCSKEW Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value 𝐹𝐴𝐼𝑅# -0.097 -2.390 -0.101 -1.790 -0.043 -0.980 -0.079 -0.970 -0.089 -1.810 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊#*' 0.021 0.820 0.070 2.030 0.068 2.460 0.029 0.540 0.085 3.040 𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁#*' -0.332 -0.650 -1.157 -1.260 -1.573 -2.310 -1.401 -1.480 -2.236 -2.760 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴#*' 0.002 0.280 -0.010 -1.160 0.020 2.500 0.002 0.130 -0.004 -0.470 𝑅𝐸𝑇#*' 0.080 4.040 0.094 3.170 0.084 3.500 0.154 3.620 0.118 4.170 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸#*' 0.138 9.170 0.099 5.770 0.093 6.510 0.187 4.790 0.085 4.950 𝑀𝐵#*' -0.001 -0.440 0.001 0.260 0.001 0.700 0.003 0.120 0.027 2.250 𝐿𝐸𝑉#*' 0.041 0.440 0.044 0.370 -0.113 -1.040 0.075 0.350 -0.106 -0.890 𝑅𝑂𝐴#*' -0.189 -2.870 -0.051 -0.590 0.034 0.230 -0.373 -2.140 -0.130 -0.540 𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸#*' 0.075 2.600 0.114 2.430 0.196 2.340 0.120 0.680 0.022 0.150 
Indus Included Included Included Included Included 
Adj_R2 0.052 0.048 0.037 0.088 0.036 
No. obs 2,420 1,372 2,140 577 1,978 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table suggests the results of sensitivity test to identify the sole effect on financial stability (with the value estimated in NCSKEW) of the effect 
of the expansion of the fair value accounting system in the regression model (3), (4) and (5) by each industry. The fair value accounting system has 
expanded since 2011, and thus our main independent variable (FAIR) has a dummy value when the year is 2011, 2012 and 2013, the value has 0; 
otherwise, 1.  
 
Across all the regressions, we take N=16,521 by using firm-years observations from 2000 to 2013. We suggest coefficient estimates with t-value 
(z-value), only significant if t-value > |2|. Column 1 shows the coefficient value, wherein the dependent variable is NCSKEW as the proxy of 
financial stability, with main independent variable FAIR, representing the expansion of fair value accounting system. Column 2 and 3 present the 
results from similar regression analyses as Column 1 with financial stability estimated with CRASH and VOL. All the variables are defined in the 
Appendix A. 
 
6.3 Early Adoption of K-IFRS on the Financial Stability 
 
Previous results show the effect of mandatory adoption of K-IFRS on the financial stability. However, several firms voluntarily 
adopted K-IFRS earlier than 2011. Early adopters may have different characteristics that are related to the financial stability 
compared to the other firms. Thus, we test the effect of the early adoption of K-IFRS on the financial stability using the following 
regression model:6  
 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊",#(𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻	&	𝑉𝑂𝐿) = 	𝛼H + 	𝛼'𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑂𝑃",# + 	𝛼+𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁",#*' + 	𝛼,𝑅𝐸𝑇",#*' + 	𝛼-𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸",#*' +	𝛼.𝑀𝐵",#*' + 	𝛼0𝐿𝐸𝑉",#*' + 𝛼R𝑅𝑂𝐴",#*' 	+ 𝛼S𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊"#*' + 𝛼T𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸",#*' 	+ 𝛴𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆 +	𝜖"# (5) 
 
where 
 𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑂𝑃",#: firms that early adopts the K-IFRS 
 
  
                                                
6 We provide the list of early adoption firms from 2009 to 2010 in Appendix B. 
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Table 7. Empirical Result of the Early Adoption Firms 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊[,\(𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻	&	𝑉𝑂𝐿)= 	αH +	α'EADOP[,\ + 	α+DTURN[,\*' + 	α,RET[,\*' + 	α-SIZE[,\*' + 	α.MB[,\*' + 	α0LEV[,\*'+ αRROA[,\*' 	+ αS𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊[\*' + αTOPAQUE[,\*' 	+ ΣINDUS +	ϵ[\ (5) 
Column (1) 
Dependent = NCSKEW 
Column (2) 
Dependent = CRASH 
Column (3) 
Dependent = VOL 
NCSKEW Coef. t-value CRASH Coef. z-value VOL Coef. t-value 𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑂𝑃# -0.089 -4.84 𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑂𝑃# -0.612 -8.06 𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑂𝑃# -0.489 -8.42 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊#*' 0.021 2.09 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊#*' 0.122 3.54 𝑁𝐶𝑆𝐾𝐸𝑊#*' 0.201 6.50 𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁#*' -0.716 -2.67 𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁#*' -3.116 -4.11 𝐷𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁#*' -6.027 -7.14 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴#*' 0.010 3.53 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴#*' 0.129 14.50 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑀𝐴#*' 0.349 38.83 𝑅𝐸𝑇#*' 0.016 3.21 𝑅𝐸𝑇#*' 0.008 0.46 𝑅𝐸𝑇#*' -0.028 -1.74 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸#*' 0.121 20.51 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸#*' -0.078 -3.36 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸#*' -0.396 -21.35 𝑀𝐵#*' 0.002 1.36 𝑀𝐵#*' 0.005 1.36 𝑀𝐵#*' 0.004 0.90 𝐿𝐸𝑉#*' -0.096 -2.33 𝐿𝐸𝑉#*' 0.843 5.92 𝐿𝐸𝑉#*' 1.274 9.84 𝑅𝑂𝐴#*' -0.141 -3.75 𝑅𝑂𝐴#*' -1.034 -6.87 𝑅𝑂𝐴#*' -1.398 -11.79 𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸#*' 0.077 3.57 𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸#*' 0.290 4.01 𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸#*' 0.586 8.66 
Indus Included  Indus Included  Indus Included  
Adj_R2 0.035  Pse_R2 0.104  Adj_R2 0.262  
No. obs 12,988  No. obs 12,988  No. obs 12,988  
Prob>F 0.000  Pro>chi2 0.000  Prob>F 0.000  
This table suggests the results of the test to identify the pure effect of the early adoption of IFRS on financial stability (with the value estimated 
with NCSKEWE, CRASH and VOL) of the effect of the expansion of fair value accounting system in the regression model (9), (10) and (11). The 
fair value accounting system has expanded since 2011, but many firms are allowed to adopt the earlier IFRS system, and thus we attempt to segment 
the effect of the early adoption. To test the effect of the early adoption, we set the additional model (9), (10) and (11), and our main independent 
variable (EADOP) has a dummy value when the firm adopts IFRS earlier than others.  
 
Across all the regressions, we take N=12,988 for model (9), (10) and (11) using firm-years observations from 2000 to 2013. We also suggest the 
results from the regression of CRASH and VOL with similar results with NCAKEW. We suggest coefficient estimates with t-value, only significant 
if t-value (z-value) > |2|. Column 1 shows the coefficient value, wherein the dependent variable is NCSKEW as the proxy of financial stability, with 
main independent variable EADOP, representing the expansion of fair value accounting system. Column 2 and 3 present the results from similar 
regression analyses as Column 1 with financial stability estimated with CRASH and VOL. All the variables are defined in the Appendix A.  
 
 
Table 7 shows the results of the effect of the early adoption of K-IFRS on the financial stability. First, column (1) in 
Table 7 suggests the negative sign (-) between financial stability (NCSKEW) and the fair value accounting before 2011 
(Coefficient: -0.0089, t-value: -4.84). This indicates that the early adoption enables companies to enjoy enhanced 
financial stability through the fair value accounting. Second, column (2) in Table 7 suggests similar results. Early 
adopters have less likelihood of crash risk. It can also be inferred that the fair value accounting is likely to lead to 
enhancement of the financial stability (Coefficient: -0.612, z-value: -8.06). Finally, column (3) in Table 7 shows that 
the early adoption firms are negatively (-) related with volatility (Coefficient: -0.489, t-value: -8.42). The results in 
Table 7 generally supports that fair value accounting decreases the firm’s crash risk as well as firm’s entire volatility 
risk. Thus, we contend that the expansion of fair value accounting improves financial stability.  
                  
7. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper attempts to test the effect of fair value accounting via the adoption of K-IFRS in 2011 on financial stability. 
Fair value accounting can affect financial stability in both ways. First, fair value accounting help evaluate the 
fundamental firm value reliably (Youngmanm 2008; IMF, 2008). Also fair value accounting mitigates the firm’s 
information asymmetry that may potentially exist between an insider and outside stakeholders by providing timely 
information. This argument supports the positive effect of fair value accounting on the financial stability. On the other 
hand, fair value can aggravate financial stability by increasing the volatility of the numbers in the financial statement. 
Ryan (2008) also supports this argument by suggesting the earnings persistence is decreased under the fair value 
accounting. Some prior studies have touched this topic, but most of them are only focused on financial industries. But, 
due to the systematic differences between financial and nonfinancial industries, results driven from prior studies 
cannot be generalized. Thus, we empirically examines the effect of the fair value accounting on the financial stability 
using nonfinancial industries.  
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To test the effect of fair value accounting on financial stability, we use Korean data. Korea provides a good research 
setting to test the effect of fair value accounting on crash risk for nonfinancial firms. Since 2011, all listed companies 
in Korea have to adopt IFRS, which requires all firms to apply extensive fair value accounting in estimating the value 
of the assets and liabilities. Since previous Korean accounting standard used historical cost accounting system, IFRS 
adoption could be a good research setting to test the effect of fair value accounting on financial stability, especially 
for nonfinancial firms.  
 
Using the listed firms in KOSPI and KOSDAQ from 2000 to 2013, we find that the expansion of fair value accounting 
increases financial stability. It supports the argument that fair value accounting prohibits managers from hiding 
information, rather it enforces the disclosure of value-relevant information to the investors. The results are consistent 
with a battery of robustness checks. To remove the effect of financial crisis on the financial stability, we examine the 
separate period, but the main results are not changed. And when we analyze the subsample of firms that adopted IFRS 
voluntarily, financial stability is also improved after the adoption of IFRS. Thus, the overall results show that the 
expansion of fair value accounting increase financial stability.  
 
Despite the measurement errors and correlated omitted problems, this paper contributes to the literatures as follows: 
First, it is the first paper that empirically examines the effect of fair value accounting on financial stability in 
nonfinancial firms. Second, by comparing the two different accounting system, historical cost accounting versus fair 
value accounting, it provides practical implication for regulators. Even though fair value accounting can be a double-
edged sword, it can work as an instrument for curbing managers’ opportunistic behavior.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Variable Definitions 
Category Definition 
Dependent Variables 
NCSKEW the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year period 
CRASH 
an indicator variable that takes the value of one for a firm-year that experiences one or more firm-
specific weekly returns falling 3.2 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns 
over the fiscal year, with 3.2 chosen to generate frequencies of 0.1% in the normal distribution during 
the fiscal year period, and zero, otherwise. 
VOL The standard deviation of firm i weekly returns at year t 
Control Variables  
DTURN the average of firm-specific weekly trading turnover over the fiscal year period of firm j at year t-1 
SIGMA the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year period of firm j at year t-1 
RET the mean of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year period, times 100 
SIZE the log value of market value of firm j at year t-1 
MB the market value of the equity divided by the book value of equity of firm j at year t-1 
LEV total debts divided by total assets of firm j at year t-1 
ROA income divided by average total assets of firm j at year t-1 
OPAQUE the moving sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals over the last three years (years t-1, t-2, and t-3). (Hutton et al. 2009) 
Variables for Sensitivity Tests 
TIME2009 the time variable of 2009 
TIME2010 the time variable of 2010 
TIME2011 the time variable of 2011 
EADOP the firm that early adopts the IFRS than others 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Early Adoption Firms of K-IFRS from 2009 to 2010 
 
Panel A 
KOSPI Transition Day Industry 
KT&G 2008.1.1 Manufacturing 
STX PANOCEAN 2008.1.1 Transportation 
Pulmuone Holdings 2008.1.1 Manufacturing 
EAGON 2008.1.1 Manufacturing 
COSMO CHEMICAL 2008.1.1 Manufacturing 
YOUGJIN Pharmaceutical 2008.1.1 Manufacturing 
LG 2009.1.1 Expert Service 
LG Display 2009.1.1 Manufacturing 
LG Life Sciences 2009.1.1 Manufacturing 
LG Household & Health Care 2009.1.1 Manufacturing 
LG Electronics 2009.1.1 Manufacturing 
LG Innotek 2009.1.1 Manufacturing 
LG U+ 2009.1.1 Communication 
LG Chem 2009.1.1 Manufacturing 
Samsung Electronics  2009.1.1 Manufacturing 
Samsung SDI 2009.1.1 Manufacturing 
KOREA FLANGE  2009.1.1 Manufacturing 
GⅡR 2009.1.1 Expert Service 
Sum of KOSPI firms  18 Firms 
   
Panel B   
KOSDAQ Transition Day Industry 
PAPER COREA 2008.1.1 Manufacturing 
INSUN ENT 2008.1.1 Wastewater Treatment 
DISPLAYTECH 2008.1.1 Manufacturing 
Palytech 2008.1.1 Manufacturing 
CUBIC KOREA 2008.1.1 Manufacturing 
ECOENERGY Holdings 2008.1.1 Manufacturing 
GIKO&ROOTIZ 2008.1.1 Manufacturing 
KOOKJE ELECTRIC KOREA 2008.4.1 Manufacturing 
NEXCON Technology 2009.1.1 Manufacturing 
DBK 2009.1.1 Manufacturing 
ENTER TECH 2009.1.1 Manufacturing 
UJU ELECTRONICS 2009.1.1 Manufacturing 
EUGENE 2009.1.1 Manufacturing 
CAVAC 2009.1.1 Manufacturing 
Sum of KOSDAQ firms  14 Firms 
Total (KOSPI and KOSDAQ firms)  32 Firms 
 
 
 
